An effective system for the protection of LAMPF primary beam lines has been built and installed. In three years of operations, it has prevented major damage from the effects of very high intensity (up to 600 pA) errant beams. The harsh environment of the target cells poses a major technical problem requiring the design of highly radiation hardened, remotely serviceable components capable of handling high thermal loads often in vacuum. After a brief discussion of general system considerations, the five major subsystems are described including design criteria, special problems encountered in implementation, operational effectiveness and planned improvements.
Introducti on
The average power of the LAMPF primary proton beam is presently about 400 kW at 800 MeV and will eventually be increased to 800 kW when the design current of 1 mA is reached. At a typical emittance of 0.5 mrad-mm, the power density is capable of inflicting thermal damage to nearly any beam line component that it strikes in times as short as 100 ps . Particles scattered from pion production targets are also capable of producing thermal damage to components. Excessive radiation doses from scattered beam or from other beam spills may cause radiation damage to components or interfere with the proper functioning of instrumentation. Beam spills may produce unacceptable component activation in areas such as the switchyard that are not designed for remote handling. Rapid loss-ofvacuum accidents, some of which can be beam induced, have damaged beam diagnostic instrumentation such as the harps (secondary emission grids used for profile measurements). Replacement of damaged components is often an expensive, time consuming task requiring remote handling.
System Considerations
Whereas a computer-based system is inherently more flexible, data processing and decision making in the LAMPF beam line protection system are generally achieved with dedicated analog electronics and hardwired logic elements in order to minimize response times. An exception is the transmission monitor (TM) which evolved from a computerized current monitoring system and remains under computer control.
Signals derived from the various protective devices limit beam currents to safe values through two systems which differ in approach and response times. The "run permit" system is an interlock chain which terminates the beam within tens of milliseconds. Beam injection is withheld until the interlock chain is reset, usually by the control room operator. The "fast protect" system interrupts beam operation at the injector within tens of microseconds. Beam injection is interrupted for the remainder of the macropulse and for as long as the interrupt signal is present. In this way, it limits the average current to a safe level.
A high degree of reliability is achieved through reliable subsystems and by redundancy since most errant beam conditions are detected by more than one device. Reliance on administrative rules or operator response is minimized. Consideration has been directed towards making the system easy to use, diagnose, and maintain while minimizing false alarms which detract from the *Supported by the U.S. An earlier version of the current monitoring system is described in Ref. 2. The radiation resistant toroids and data acquisition hardware are still used. In the present electronics, a single NIM-style module performs all signal-handling functions. The amplifier has a "negative resistance" input characteristic which is achieved by positive feedback on the amplifier so that the overall loop resistance, including the toroid winding, cable, and amplifier input, is close to zero. In this way the L/R time constant is made much longer than the beam macropulse width thereby eliminating variation in inductance among toroids as a factor in system response. The elimination of the time constant effects was critical in obtaining optimal performance 
The watchdog timer is a CAMAC module that must be reset every two seconds by the computer; otherwise it will time out and shut off the beam. This is to help insure that the computer program is running correctly. The frequency at which the program checks transmission is an adjustable program parameter. It is presently checked every 250 ms, and is not fast enough to prevent damage for the situation analyzed in Ref. 1 .
At the present operating current of about 500 aA, the tolerance levels are typically 2 to 3 ,uA, which are well above the electronic noise levels. More serious noise is introduced by real variations in transmission which are correlated with rotating targets. SCR spikes, originating in magnet power supplies during the beam gate, occasionally give trouble. The credibility of the TM suffers from an annoying number of false alarms, many of which are caused by momentary fluctuations that exceed tolerance.
A hardwired TM is being developed that will have a fast response (100 ps) to very large spills as well as long integration time constants for accurate measurement of small anomalous losses. It will interrupt the beam via the fast protect system.
Secondary Emission Guard Rings
These are fast, radiation hardened spill monitors that are placed in front of collimators in the target cells and near the beam stop. They are used both for protection and diagnostic purposes. The detector shown in Fig. 3 consists of two signal planes each divided into quadrants and three high voltage planes surrounded by an isolated ground casing. The vacuum feedthrough is a Gulton Durock Hermetic TI-12-10 connector with radiation hard (X101'5 rads) silico-ceramic insulation.
Nickel wire, sleeved with alumina beads, is used to make the connections that are spot welded rather than soldered. 
